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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1361

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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AMEMBASSY CARACAS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 05968

FROM AMBASSADOR MC CLINTOCK

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XL

SUBJECT: THE DITCHLEY FOUNDATION CONFERENCE ON THE
STABILITY OF THE CARIBBEAN

1. UNDER DEPARTMENTAL ORDERS I ATTENDED THE ABOVE CON-
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ERENCE, SPONSORED BY THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT, AT DITCHLEY PARK FROM MAY 17-20. PAPERS WERE PRESENTED ON "ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE CARIBBEAN", EDUCATION AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN THE CARIBBEAN", "SOVIET PRESSURES IN THE CARIBBEAN", "THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE CARIBBEAN", "SOVIET NAVAL POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN-POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS". I ALSO CONTRIBUTED A FORMULATION OF US INTERESTS IN THE AREA BUT DID NOT TABLE A PAPER.

2. THE CONFERENCE WAS PRESIDED OVER BY RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL R. L. CLUTTERBUCK, FORMER ENGINEER IN CHIEF OF THE BRITISH ARMY AND WAS ATTENDED BY A DISTINGUISHED GROUP OF ACADEMICS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INCLUDING BRIAN CROZIER, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND BRIEFERS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE PLUS ACADEMIC PARTICIPANTS FROM THE NETHERLANDS, SWITZERLAND, FRANCE AND JAMAICA. LIKEWISE PRESENT WAS THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF BARBADOS, CAMERON TUDOR, AND THE COUNSELOR OF THE JAMAICAN EMBASSY IN LONDON, ANTHONY HILL.

3. MAIN LACK OF CONFERENCE WAS INDIGENOUS REPRESENTATION FROM THE SPANISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN. BECAUSE OF ITS COMPOSITION EMPHASIS WAS LAID ON THE BLACK, ENGLISH-SPEAKING ISLAND ENTITIES; BUT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF PROFESSOR HALPERIN OF THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, PROFESSOR H. S. THOMAS (SON-IN-LAW OF LORD GLADWIN) AND THE AUTHOR OF THE MONUMENTAL WORK ON CUBA, PLUS MY OWN INTERVENTION AND THAT OF THE FRENCH PROFESSOR RAVEAU, WE AT LAST MANAGED TO ACHIEVE A BALANCE OF VIEW BETWEEN THE CARIBBEAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES AND THE NON-ENGLISH SPEAKING STATES AND COLONIES. IT WAS DISTURBING THAT MOST PARTICIPANTS REGARDED PUERTO RICO AS A US COLONY BUT TO THIS I GAVE A VIGOROUS REBUTTAL, POINTING OUT THE PRACTICALLY INDEPENDENT STATUS OF PUERTO RICO, ITS PRIVILEGED POSITION AS A US COMMONWEALTH AND ITS ENTIRE FREEDOM OF SELF-DETERMINATION, WHETHER FOR INDEPENDENCE, STATEHOOD OR ITS PRESENT HIGHLY FAVORED SITUATION.

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4. IN GENERAL, THE CONFERENCE CONCLUSIONS WERE PESSIMISTIC. THE MINI-STATES OF THE CARIBBEAN WERE HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO A NUMBER OF INIMICAL PRESSURES. BRIAN CROZIER QUESTIONED WHETHER THE GAINING OF INDEPENDENCE WAS IN FACT AN AUTOMATIC SOLUTION FOR ALL PROBLEMS.

5. THE ONLY UNIFYING FACTOR IN THE HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF CUBA AND

THE CONTINENTAL STATES SUCH AS COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA, WAS THE FACTOR OF SLAVERY, EVENTUAL EMANCIPATION AND NOW INDEPENDENCE. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE RACIAL TENSIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN INVOLVING NOT ONLY THE MORE OBVIOUS TENSIONS BETWEEN BLACK MAJORITIES AND WHITE AND BROWN MINORITIES, BUT ALSO RACIAL DIFFERENCES AND RIVALRIES BETWEEN THE EAST INDIAN ELEMENTS, AS IN GUYANA SURINAM AND TRINIDAD, AND BLACK MAJORITIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES.

6. THERE WERE LIKEWISE GRAVE DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION WITH A GAP BETWEEN RE
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SCHOOLING. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT IN JAMAICA EACH YEAR OF 40,000 LEAVING SCHOOL, ONLY 10,000 COULD FIND JOBS. MUCH OF INTERNAL INSTABILITY IN THE

CARIBBEAN COMES FROM UNEMPLOYED YOUNG PEOPLE.

7. BLACK POWER WAS DEALT WITH BY A BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST AND THEREFORE CAME OFF FAIRLY LIGHTLY. IN GENERAL, THE BLACK DELEGATES TENDED TO PLAY DOWN ITS INFLUENCE AND THE WHITE PARTICIPANTS THOUGHT IT WAS A

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DANGER WHICH MIGHT CAUSE GRAVE DIFFICULTY IN THE FUTURE. PROFESSOR SPECKMANN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN, WHO HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 1969 RIOTS IN CURACAO, MADE CLEAR THE EXPLOSIVE CHARACTER OF THIS KIND OF POPULAR ANTI- WHITE DEMONSTRATION AND SAID THAT CONCLUSIONS OF HIS COMMISSION WERE UNMISTAKABLE THAT LOCAL POLICE COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON TO PUT DOWN SUCH RIOTS. HE MADE THE INTERESTING COMMENT THAT THE POLICE OF CURACAO HAD SAID THEY KNEW MOST OF THE RIOTERS AND THEREFORE COULD NOT SHOOT AT THEM. IT WAS NOT UNTIL DUTCH MARINES WERE DEPLOYED THAT ORDER WAS RESTORED AT WILLEMSTAD. SPECKMANN AND OTHERS AGREED WITH ME THAT IN THE EVENT OF FURTHER RACE RIOTS IN THE DUTCH ANTILLES OR IN TRINIDAD, VENEZUELA COULD BE EXPECTED TO INTERVENE. I ALSO OFFERED OBSERVATION THAT IF LIVES OF US TOURISTS WERE THREATENED IN THE CARIBBEAN BY RACIAL DISTURBANCES, THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PLACED UNDER ALMOST IRRESISTABLE PRESSURE TO SEND NAVAL HELP QUICKLY.

8. ON GENERAL SUBJECT OF SECURITY, THE CONFERENCE AGREED THAT LOCAL POLICE FORCES WERE USELESS IN PUTTING DOWN CIVIL DISTURBANCES. HOWEVER, WEAK GOVERNMENTS FACED WITH CRISES WOULD BE TEMPTED TO ASK FOR AID FROM PRACTICALLY ANYWHERE, PROBABLY IN THE FORM OF NAVAL PRESENCE, AND THE SHIPS CALLED UPON COULD BE US, BRITISH, DUTCH, FRENCH -- OR SOVIET. THE CONFERENCE UNANIMOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT IDEAL SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR VARIOUS CARIBBEAN STATES TO BAND TOGETHER TO ESTABLISH A JOINT SECURITY FORCE.

9. ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ADMITTEDLY DEFICIT COUNTRIES, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF BARBADOS WAS THE MOST SPECIFIC. HE SAID THERE WERE 6 AREAS IN WHICH US COULD ASSIST THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. THESE WERE:

A) MORE " SOFT" LOANS.

B) MORE INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS, EITHER WITH GOVERNMENTS OR PRIVATE ENTERPRISES.

C) FURNISHING OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY.

D) SUPPORT OF 3 RD WORLD COUNTRIES TO HELP THEM SELL THEIR PRIMARY PRODUCTS.

E) THE PROVISION OF MORE TECHNOLOGICAL TRAINING.

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10. THE CONFERENCE UNIFORMLY AGREED THAT TOURISM WAS THE PRINCIPAL DOLLAR EARNER OF THE CARIBBEAN AREA AND THAT, IN THE WORDS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROFESSOR MANYONI " TOURISTS ARE INEVITABLY WHITE AND ASSOCIATED WITH A SUPER- POWER." IT WAS ALSO REPEATEDLY RECOGNIZED THAT BLACK POWER OR OTHER ANTI- WHITE EXPLOSIONS WERE THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE INDISPENSABLE TOURIST INDUSTRY.

11. ON CUBA, VARYING VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED. ON THE ONE HAND, THE CONFERENCE RAPPOREUR QUOTED A FRENCH COMMUNIST THAT " THERE IS A COLONIALISM OF THE LEFT AS WELL AS A COLONIALISM OF THE RIGHT"; AND IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ACHIEVED A SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS IN ESTABLISHING ITSELF IN CUBA. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET UNION HAD A SERIOUS BUDGETARY BURDEN IN CARRYING THE CUBAN ECONOMY AND SUPPLYING CUBA WITH ITS SOLE SOURCE OF ENERGY. MOST CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT STRATEGICALLY THE USSR HAD GAINED SIGNIFICANTLY IN ESTABLISHING ITSELF AT THE " BACK DOOR OF THE UNITED STATES".

12. THE BARBADOS HIGH COMMISSIONER, TUDOR, SAID THAT LAST YEAR WHEN HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO NEGOTIATE FOR HIS OWN GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF JAMAICA, TRINIDAD AND GUYANA FOR THEIR RECOGNITION OF THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT, HE HAD DISCERNED IN THE THEN CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON A DESIRE TO " NORMALIZE" RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES BOTH IN WRITING AND VERBALLY THAT CUBA WOULD NOT TRY TO SUBVERT THESE FOUR ENGLISH- SPEAKING CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, AND NOTED THAT THIS WAS A STRIKING CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS CUBAN DEMANDS FOR OVERTHROW OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN. WHEN I ASKED IF THESE ASSURANCES WERE A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO RECOGNITION BY THE FOUR CARIBBEAN STATES THE HIGH COMMISSIONER SAID " NO". HE CONCLUDED WITH THE REMARK THAT " THE CUBANS WANT KISSINGER TO COME, EITHER TO

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

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INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

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GUANTANAMO OR HAVANA".

13. HOWEVER, OTHER CONFEREES TOOK A MORE PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF THE CUBAN PROBLEM. PROFESSOR HALPERIN MADE POINT THAT CASTRO HAD PROVED TO LATIN AMERICA THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE SUCCESSFULLY TO DEFY THE US. HE SAID " CASTRO HAS LIT A FLAME IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE THAT HE CAN NOW SIT BACK AND WATCH, PROTECTED BY THE BRESHNEV DOCTRINE." THE SUCCESS OF CASTRO AND OTHERS
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IN DEFYING THE US HAD ENCOURAGED EXTREME NATIONALISTIC ANTI- AMERICAN ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA TO CREATE A NEW IDEOLOGY, NAMELY THAT " FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPOVERISHES". THIS NEW BODY OF LEFT WING IS PRESSING ON VARIOUS LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS, AS WITNESS THE UNANIMITY OF ANTI- AMERICAN SENTIMENT AT RECENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IN PANAMA. ALTHOUGH PERHAPS REMOTE, THERE INDEED WAS A POSSIBLE RISK THAT, WITH SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN, ANTI- AMERICAN LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS THOSE OF CHILE AND PERU MIGHT LINE UP WITH THE USSR.

14. I FOUND ALMOST COMPLETE IGNORANCE AMONG CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS OF VENEZUELA' S ACTIVE NEW

POLICY OF PENETRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN. NO ONE SEEMED TO KNOW OF FONMIN CALVANI'S INITIATIVES, EVEN WITH RESPECT TO QUESTIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA. THEY THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT GREATER INTEREST BY BOTH VENEZUELA AND MEXICO WOULD BE BENEFICIAL.

15. AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHAIRMAN, I SUMMED UP US INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA BY QUOTING ADM. MAHAN'S DICTUM THAT " THE CARIBBEAN IS THE MEDITERRANEAN OF THE AMERICAS." I REMINDED THE CONFEREES THAT DESPITE ALL THE TALK OF SOVIET PENETRATION, THE REAL PARENTHESIS OF POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN WAS THAT OF THE US BASED ON PUERTO RICO AND PANAMA TO SAY NOTHING OF ADJACENT FLORIDA AND THE ATLANTIC. US STILL HAS STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN OF WHICH NOT LEAST WAS THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF THE PANAMA CANAL, OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO ALL COUNTRIES OF THE PACIFIC AND TO BOTH COASTS OF THE US. FURTHERMORE, WE HAD STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN PETROLEUM IN VENEZUELA AND BAUXITE IN JAMAICA, GUYANA AND SURINAM. THE CONFEREES SHOULD NOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE US IS THE MOST IMPORTANT MARKET FOR THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES AND THAT IF AT SOME FUTURE DATE THE CUBAN SUGAR QUOTA SHOULD BE RESTORED THERE WOULD BE AGONIZED HOWLS NOT ONLY FROM CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS SANTO DOMINGO BUT FROM A WEALTH OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS NOW SHARING THE QUOTA. FURTHERMORE, AS HAD BEEN NOTED, THE US WAS THE MAIN SOURCE OF TOURIST INCOME IN THE CARIBBEAN. WHILE WE WOULD LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY ON EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LOT OF THE CARIBBEAN

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COUNTRIES THEY SHOULD NOT LOOK TO THE US AS A HAVEN FOR THEIR SURPLUS POPULATION.

16. THE CONFERENCE ENDED ON A NOTE OF SOMEWHAT PESSIMISTIC REDISCOVERY OF A NEURALGIC AREA IN WHICH THE PROBLEMS OF POVERTY, OVERPOPULATION AND DEPENDENCE ON PRODUCTION OF LOW- COST RAW MATERIALS WERE SCARCELY OFFSET BY EARNINGS FROM TOURISM AND BY ATTEMPTS TO ADAPT EDUCATION MORE REALISTICALLY TO PEOPLES AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT. RACIAL TENSIONS, BOTH ANTI- WHITE AND ANTI- BROWN, MIGHT CONTINUE TO CREATE EXPLOSIVE SITUATIONS WITH WHICH LOCAL POLICE FORCES COULD NOT COPE; AND THERE WAS NEED FOR THE CARIBBEAN MINI- STATES TO BAND TOGETHER IN CREATING A MUTUAL SECURITY FORCE. ON THE WHOLE, THE SOVIET THREAT DID NOT LOOM AS LARGE AS SOME WOULD PORTRAY AND THE INEVITABILITY OF RECOGNITION BY LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS OF THE CASTRO REGIME SUGGESTED THAT POSSIBLY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF WOULD EVENTUALLY DESIRE TO RETURN TO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US. HOWEVER, CASTRO'S SUCCESS IN DEFYING T

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